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New Books |
![]() Ebook: EI 429 Beyond the Realms : Navigating the Metaverse By Akashdeep Bhardwaj | ![]() Ebook: EI 430 The Human Side of Digital Business Transformation By Kamales Lardi | ![]() Ebook: EI 431 The Future Is BIG : How Emerging Technologies Are By Uma Vanka |
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Articles |
Strategic channel decisions for the supplier and specialized e‐retailer in the presence of a third‐party marketplace. By Sun, Shuxiao;Hu, Huaqing;Ge, Zehui;Li, Yanlin International Transactions in Operational Research. Nov2025, Vol. 32 Issue 6, p3565-3599. 35p. Abstract :With the advancement of e‐commerce and the intensification of market competition, many suppliers have leveraged third‐party online marketplaces to expand their sales channels and bolster competitiveness. This poses potential threats to e‐retailers specializing in the core business of certain categories. This study examines a specialized e‐retailer`s selling mode choice (reselling, in‐marketplace selling, or agency selling mode) and how this choice interacts with a supplier`s channel strategy (marketplace, e‐retailer, or both/dual channels) in the presence of a third‐party marketplace. Our findings indicate that (1) the e‐retailer`s optimal selling mode is contingent on the supplier`s sales service quality and efficiency, and the e‐retailer`s market occupation. Generally, when initially occupying a small market, the e‐retailer prefers selling in a third‐party marketplace, whereas when the initial market is relatively large, the e‐retailer is more inclined to opt for the reselling (agency selling) mode if the supplier`s sales efficiency is low (high). Additionally, if the supplier`s sales service quality is low, the e‐retailer will never choose the agency selling mode. (2) Exclusively introducing the marketplace channel is not the optimal choice for the supplier. Instead, adopting a dual channel is better when the direct selling cost is not too high. (3) Under certain scenarios, the supplier can manipulate the e‐retailer`s channel by introducing the marketplace channel and offering a reference price without actually selling any products. | |||
The impact of blockchain technology on competing suppliers on an E-commerce platform. By Yu, Jiahao;Yan, Yuhan;Meng, Lu (Monroe);Huang, Rongyi Information & Management. Sep2025, Vol. 62 Issue 6, pN.PAG-N.PAG. 1p. Abstract :We develop a game-theoretic model to explore the impact of blockchain adoption on various players within a platform supply chain, as well as its interaction with selling contract strategies. In our model, the high-class supplier determines the blockchain adoption strategy, and the low-class supplier selects the selling contract. Our analysis shows that the low-class supplier benefits from the high-class supplier`s adoption of blockchain, resulting in higher prices for both products. In the sequential equilibrium, the high-class supplier`s blockchain adoption decision is driven by operational costs, whereas the low-class supplier`s choice of selling contract depends on its product quality. Additionally, we extend the model to analyze scenarios where the high-class supplier operates through a reselling channel and investigate the impact of endogenous quality decisions. | |||
Strategic choices in live-streaming e-commerce: Balancing live-streaming selling mode and return-freight insurance strategy. By Chen, Zhongwei;Ji, Chenlu;Zhang, Lin;Zhang, Jianghua Journal of Retailing & Consumer Services. Sep2025, Vol. 86, pN.PAG-N.PAG. 1p. Abstract :Live-streaming commerce is swiftly rising. While collaborating with Key Opinion Leaders (KOLs) enhances sales through product information sharing, pricing constraints and high commission fees erode the e-tailer`s margins. Currently, self-streaming powered by artificial intelligence (AI) offers cost-efficient alternatives by reducing product unfit risks. However, persistent mismatch concerns still make the e-tailer offer return-freight insurance (RI) popular. We explore how the e-tailer strategically selects live-streaming modes (top KOL, regular KOL, or self-streaming with AI) and RI strategies. Using a two-stage game-theoretic model, we have following key findings. Offering RI will increase the retail price, with KOLs increasing commission fees only when their role in reducing product misfit risks is limited. Compared to a regular KOL, the top KOL may leverage the bargaining power to drive down the retail price. Additionally, the e-tailer is most likely to offer RI when contracting with a regular KOL (due to limited misfit reduction) and least with self-streaming with AI. Crucially, offering RI can complement the top KOL collaboration but cannot substitute it. The findings further indicate that if unit product salvage is low, or unit salvage is high while the top KOL shows high fan effects, the e-tailer may prefer a top KOL; otherwise, choosing a regular KOL is the optimal solution. In particular, self-streaming with AI thrives if there are low AI adoption costs and weak KOLs` fan effects, especially when unit salvage is low. These results can help e-commerce platforms optimize commissions, enhance streaming partnerships, and improve AI tools for better consumer-product matching. • We study e-tailer`s live-streaming mode and return-freight insurance (RI) strategy. • Top KOLs utilize bargaining power to lower the retail price compared to regular KOLs. • E-tailer favors RI with regular KOLs, then top KOLs, least with AI self-streaming. • Offering RI can complement the top KOL collaboration but cannot substitute it. • Product salvages, fan effects, and AI costs shape optimal live-streaming modes. | |||
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News |
Can India’s digital economy keep pace with its own explosive growth? By Fortune India, 28th June 2025 |
India`s e-commerce, sourcing fuelling growth for Walmart: CEO Doug McMillon By Mint; 24th June 2025 |
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