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RT 414 Business Analytics for Effective Decision Making By Sumi, K. V.;R., Vasanthagopal | RT 415 Empresas familiares y su gobierno corporativo By Miguel Obregón Cervantes | RT 416 No B.S. Direct Marketing : The Ultimate No Holds B By https://research.ebsco.com/c/3wijlj/search/details |
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| Articles |
| Platform‐led or seller‐led? Optimal ex ante information delivery strategy for online retail channels with product match uncertainty. By Wang, Chen;Fu, Yujia;Yin, Zhe International Transactions in Operational Research. Mar2026, Vol. 33 Issue 2, p1232-1268. 37p. Abstract :A fundamental weakness for online retail channels is that it is impossible for consumers to perfectly ascertain the match between their preferences and the product value before purchasing. In this paper, based on the investment decision of the ex ante product information delivery measure, we study how to solve this problem for a platform‐based supply chain that consists of an online platform and an online seller. According to which firm is responsible for building the product information delivery measure, two possible cases are considered under a game‐theoretic model: the platform‐led case and the seller‐led case. The basic results reveal that compared with the seller‐led product information delivery, the platform‐led case may lead to a higher matching probability for consumers, a higher profit for the whole supply chain, and a win‐win outcome for the platform and the seller. The basic results can still hold when the platform and the seller cooperate under the format of the proportional commission fee, the two firms have different investment efficiencies in the improvement of product information delivery, or consumers have to incur hassle costs to learn the product match probability. When product return is allowed, it is shown that the return policy can play a positive role in making the seller‐led case become a win‐win choice. When the joint investment of product information delivery between the two firms can be formed, the results show that the joint investment may achieve a higher matching probability and higher profits for both the seller and the platform. | |||
| Pricing and bundling decisions for complementary products in an agency selling platform with risk‐averse suppliers and stochastic demand. By Hemmati, M.;Ghomi, S.M.T. Fatemi;Li, Hongyan International Transactions in Operational Research. Mar2026, Vol. 33 Issue 2, p1323-1361. 39p. Abstract :The exponential rise of e‐commerce has prompted many companies to utilize online platforms (e‐tailers) to sell their products. Agency selling is a prevalent policy among e‐tailers where suppliers determine retail prices of their products, and the e‐tailer charges an agency rate. This paper investigates the selling format and pricing problem of two risk‐averse suppliers who sell complementary products on the e‐tailer`s platform. The e‐tailer can offer products separately and as a bundle. A game‐theoretic analysis reveals that the equilibrium prices of individual products and the bundle uniquely exist. The study explores that the e‐tailer does not always benefit from a higher agency rate. Furthermore, the agency rate can influence the superiority of mixed bundling over separate selling. Moreover, a mixed‐bundling strategy may hurt the supplier`s profitability which is sensitive to marginal costs and the degree of risk aversion. Finally, when demand correlation increases, the supplier sets a lower price to mitigate the risk cost. | |||
| Contract adoption of motivating green technological innovation in a supply chain. By Li, Bo;Wen, Shuning;Li, Xiufeng;Cheng, Yuepeng International Transactions in Operational Research. Jan2026, Vol. 33 Issue 1, p603-630. 28p. Abstract :Green technological innovation has been widely recognized around the world; however, consumer environmental awareness may result in uncertain market demand growth and lead to manufacturers` risk‐averse attitude towards green technological innovation. This paper focuses on the contract adoption problem of a risk‐averse manufacturer who is responsible for green technological innovation, through a resell contract (RC) or agency contract (AC) with a retail platform. Stackelberg models are built, and the conditional value at risk method is used to measure the manufacturer`s risk‐averse behavior. The differences between two contracts are compared. We find that when the commission rate is less than some threshold, the green technological level under AC is greater than that under RC regardless of the fixed cost coefficient, otherwise the green technological level under RC is higher. Further, there is the dual excellent region for AC and RC where the manufacturer can not only obtain a higher level of green technology but also achieve better utility. Finally, consumer surplus and social welfare under two contracts are performed through numerical experiments. | |||
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| World’s biggest brands are testing their tricks in India first By Economic Times; Dec 11, 2025 |
| ET CEO Roundtable 2025: Leaders to shape “The India Way” amid global uncertainty By Economic Times; Dec 11, 2025 |
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