 |
Learning Resource Centre Monthly Bulletin |
 |
| |
Learning Resource Centre Monthly Bulletin |
|
| New Books |
RT 420 Driving Retail Transformation : How to Navigate Di By Oliver Banks | RT 421 Service Workers in the Era of Monopoly Capital : A By Fabian van Onzen | RT 422 Walking Mannequins : How Race and Gender Inequalit By Joya Misra;Kyla Walters |
| Click Here to learn about the Recent Books added to our collection on different topics of Management. |
| Articles |
| Decision‐making and coordination of a three‐tier fresh agricultural product supply chain considering dynamic freshness‐keeping effort. By Wang, Xuefeng;Xiong, Meifei;Yang, Fang;Shi, Wenqiang International Transactions in Operational Research. May2026, Vol. 33 Issue 3, p2052-2081. 30p. Abstract :The freshness‐keeping of agricultural products is an essential issue that affects business development, food safety, and human health. Due to the structural characteristics of the supply chain, keeping the freshness of agricultural products involves different entities and multiple links, which is a long‐term strategic issue requiring significant investment. Given the perishability of agricultural products, the aging of preservation facilities, or the decline of technology, it is critical to consider the multitier freshness‐keeping strategy from a dynamic perspective. Therefore, this paper studies dynamic freshness‐keeping and coordination of a multitier agricultural product supply chain. We first construct a differential equation considering the three‐tier freshness‐keeping efforts. Then, we compare the optimal freshness‐keeping efforts, retail price, and system profit between the decentralized and centralized decision‐making models. Finally, two contracts based on cost‐sharing and secondary transfer payment are designed to coordinate the decentralized decision‐making model. Results show that (i) as the decision sequence moves backward, freshness‐keeping effort decreases at each tier for the same freshness‐keeping efficiency; (ii) adopting the centralized decision‐making model offers several advantages, including well‐balanced freshness‐keeping efforts across multiple tiers, a lower retail price, and higher system profit; and (iii) under a specified payment range, the "freshness‐keeping cost‐sharing‐two‐part fee" contract motivates entities to increase freshness‐keeping efforts and realizes individual and system‐wide profit improvements. | |||
| Trade‐in program options in a retailer‐led supply chain. By Zhao, Wenyu;Xia, Yulan;Zhang, Lu;Fan, Xiaojun International Transactions in Operational Research. May2026, Vol. 33 Issue 3, p2119-2156. 38p. Abstract :Firms offer trade‐in programs that consumers trade an old product and receive trade‐in rebate when buying a new one. To study whether the manufacturer or the retailer should introduce a trade‐in program, we build a Stackelberg game that consists of one manufacturer and one retailer by considering old and new consumers in a retailer‐led supply chain. We find that when the production cost of a product is high under no trade‐in program, old consumers do not purchase the product. When the retailer provides the trade‐in program, there are "lose–win" situation for the manufacturer and retailer. However, when the manufacturer provides the trade‐in program, there are "win–win" situation for the manufacturer and retailer. Then, we find that the manufacturer (retailer) can benefit more from providing trade‐in program by themselves than that provided by the other one. | |||
| Platform‐led or seller‐led? Optimal ex ante information delivery strategy for online retail channels with product match uncertainty. By Wang, Chen;Fu, Yujia;Yin, Zhe International Transactions in Operational Research. Mar2026, Vol. 33 Issue 2, p1232-1268. 37p. Abstract :A fundamental weakness for online retail channels is that it is impossible for consumers to perfectly ascertain the match between their preferences and the product value before purchasing. In this paper, based on the investment decision of the ex ante product information delivery measure, we study how to solve this problem for a platform‐based supply chain that consists of an online platform and an online seller. According to which firm is responsible for building the product information delivery measure, two possible cases are considered under a game‐theoretic model: the platform‐led case and the seller‐led case. The basic results reveal that compared with the seller‐led product information delivery, the platform‐led case may lead to a higher matching probability for consumers, a higher profit for the whole supply chain, and a win‐win outcome for the platform and the seller. The basic results can still hold when the platform and the seller cooperate under the format of the proportional commission fee, the two firms have different investment efficiencies in the improvement of product information delivery, or consumers have to incur hassle costs to learn the product match probability. When product return is allowed, it is shown that the return policy can play a positive role in making the seller‐led case become a win‐win choice. When the joint investment of product information delivery between the two firms can be formed, the results show that the joint investment may achieve a higher matching probability and higher profits for both the seller and the platform. | |||
Do you wish to explore more articles? Just try using one of the full-text databases below!
| |||
| Faculty - Click here to recommend new topics in Retail |
| News |
| Inside IPO-bound Flipkart’s C-suite: How the leadership team stacks up By Economic Times; Feb 2, 2026 |
| Budget 2026: Footwear and leather sector gets export boost By Economic Times; Feb 1, 2026 |
Wish to see more News? Click the link below:
|
